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Reviewing Inter Partes Review Five Years In: The View From University Technology 
Transfer Offices  
 
Cynthia Laury Dahl 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When the America Invents Act (“AIA”) was passed in 2011,1 university tech transfer 
offices (“TTOs”) were braced for big changes and potentially some fairly dire consequences. 
Together with other intellectual property-reliant entities, TTOs were worried that certain 
provisions of the AIA would directly attack the value of their patents and therefore chip away at 
their ability to pursue a business model based on protecting invention and licensing.  
Among the most sobering of the provisions were a series of new post-grant patent review 
proceedings. These proceedings provided several new mechanisms for third parties to challenge 
already granted patents and potentially invalidate them. Designed to “weed out” weak patents 
that should not have been granted, these proceedings nonetheless had much broader applications. 
Because the proceedings were designed to be less expensive than litigation and to grant quicker 
yet final results, the concern was that they would become an attractive option for any third party, 
including potential infringers, to employ to challenge any patent, weak or strong. TTOs and other 
patent owners feared that the net result of these post-grant review proceedings would be to strip 
them of their assets, or at the very least cost them money in terms of lower patent value, 
uncertainty, and cost to defend.  
They were partially correct. Seven years after implementation, these post-grant challenge 
proceedings and specifically inter partes review (“IPR”) have in fact completely changed the 
landscape of patent litigation, as well as invalidation challenges for defendants to a patent suit.2 
Not only are the numbers of IPRs voluminous, but the likelihood that a patent subject to an IPR 
is declared at least in part invalid is very high.3 However, although the literature seems to 
indicate that IPRs have had a universally chilling effect on patents, the experience of several 
TTO offices reveals a different story. As relayed in their own words, TTOs report that assets 
have thus far been mostly immune from IPR attack. This is due to a variety of reasons connected 
to the mission of TTOs and the nature of the intellectual property (“IP”) they protect. Although 
the specter of post-grant challenge proceedings has in fact cost TTOs some resources through 
increased uncertainty and the need to adapt to the new law, the overall effect has been far milder 
than expected. TTOs explain that post-grant challenge proceedings in general and IPRs in 
 
1 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered 
sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
2 Jake Berdine & Matt Rosenberg, Creating Leverage: A Practitioner’s Guide to Inter Partes Review and Its Effects 
on Intellectual Property License Negotiations, 44 AIPLA Q.J. 13 (Winter 2016) (“The AIA-implemented post-grant 
procedures fundamentally changed the landscape for defendants who are approached by patent owners seeking 
royalty payments for potentially invalid patents.”). 
3 Jesse Schwartz, Supreme Court Takes Up Inter Partes Review: Is Relief In Sight?, TECH TRANSFER ENEWS BLOG 
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://techtransfercentral.com/2017/08/30/supreme-court-takes-up-inter-partes-review-is-relief-in-
sight/ (“About 74% of IPRs with final written decisions have resulted in all claims being invalidated – more than 
1,200 of them so far – and about 14% have invalidated at least some claims. Only 12% have resulted in challenged 
patents being fully upheld.”).  
 
 
 
particular have not had a significant impact on TTO licensing, nor on their traditional approach 
to patent filing, patent enforcement, and budgeting.  
This topic is ripe for analysis. It has been seven years since the IPR procedure was 
enacted, and with the benefit now of two Supreme Court cases interpreting IPR, plus anecdotal 
information from the universities themselves, we can gather a much more accurate picture of 
IPR’s actual effects on TTOs.4 In addition, barring large legislative changes, these effects are 
unlikely to shift over the next several years, although throughout this Chapter I will discuss some 
interesting and still evolving issues that may change the analysis slightly. Finally, although TTOs 
by and large have not changed their approach because of these post-grant challenge proceedings, 
the seven years have given some TTOs enough time to adopt a very few small shifts in policy 
that might be instructive for others to learn about or perhaps emulate. These small shifts are 
helping those TTOs to inoculate themselves from even the minor tremors caused by the 
possibility of post-grant challenge.  
The first section of this Chapter provides a brief context for the AIA discussion, 
including what the AIA was designed to address, some of the changes that were implemented 
under the AIA, a brief description of the challenge proceedings, and why IPRs are the most 
relevant challenge proceeding to consider when discussing TTOs. The section also describes the 
methodology behind a survey I conducted of eighteen university TTOs to gather instructive 
anecdotal evidence presented below.  
The second section contains the survey comments. It discusses why IPRs are theoretically 
worrisome for patent owners, but explains why IPRs have not significantly affected TTO policies 
and procedures about what patents they file, their licensing practices, how they enforce their 
patents, and their budgeting.  
The final section looks forward from this point, highlighting some topics about IPRs that 
remain open and discussing some court cases, legislative initiatives and executive branch 
responses that—depending on result—may potentially have an impact on IPRs, and therefore 
TTO policy.  
 
II. AIA background and the importance of IPR  
 
The AIA was the first major overhaul of the patent laws in fifty years. Before its passage, 
conventional wisdom was that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) was 
allowing too many broadly-worded patents to issue and that enforcing such patents was stifling 
innovation.5 Especially large organizations in the computer/telecommunications, financial 
services and information technology industries were clamoring for stricter scrutiny of patents.6 
Out of this history and given this perspective, Congress included a number of updates to patent 
law under the AIA.  
Among other changes, the AIA expanded patent review proceedings, both pre- and post- 
issuance. Of particular concern to TTOs are three new post-grant procedures available for third 
parties to challenge the validity of patents that have already issued: Post Grant Review 
 
4 For background information on the subject, see Robert MacWright, Three Years after the America Invents Act: 
Practical Effects on University Tech Transfer, 52 (3) LES NOUVELLES – J. LICENSING EXECUTIVES SOC’Y, June 
2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961434; John Morgana &Veronica Sandoval, Pacific Northwest Perspective: The 
Impact of the America Invents Act on Nonprofit Global Health Organizations, 9 WASH J. L. TECH. & ARTS 177 
(2013).  
5 Mark A. Lemley, The Unsurprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 9, 10 (2016).  
6 MacWright, supra note 4 at 72.  
 
 
(“PGR”)7; Covered Business Method Review (“CBM”)8; and IPR.9 These new processes were 
designed to “produc[e] better patents and rectif[y] improper issuances” by expediting 
challenges.10 However, patent holders believe the overall effect has been that third parties may 
more easily challenge patents, regardless of their merits, and the procedures can result in 
significant delay and expense for patent owners.11  
Which of the above procedures is appropriate depends on the party using the challenge, 
the timing of challenge, the basis and type of challenge, and the subject matter of the patent. 
PGR can only be used for a limited time (within the first nine months after a patent issues) but 
any third party can use PGR to bring any evidence to bear that successfully proves invalidity on 
many bases, including patentable subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and double patenting. 
CBM is only applicable against business method patents and the challenger has to have been 
sued for infringement under the patent. However, for the lifetime of the patent (after nine months 
after issuance) a third party can use CBM to offer any material to invalidate the subject patent on 
most any basis, including patentable subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and double 
patenting. IPR is a much narrower tool in that third parties may use only other patents or written 
material to invalidate the subject patent under Section 102 or 103 (novelty and nonobviousness) 
of the Patent Act. However, similar to CBM, IPR can be used throughout the lifetime of the 
patent (after nine months after issuance), but the patent may cover any subject matter. The IPR 
proceeding can either run in parallel to an active litigation or can be instituted outside of 
litigation. The district court will often stay the court case waiting for the IPR result.12  
Of the several new proceedings, the most relevant to TTOs is the IPR. The other two 
proceedings either involve subject matter that is not usually patented by TTOs (for example the 
“practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,” relevant to the 
patents subject to CBM), or are only relevant at a stage where a TTO patent is unlikely to be 
challenged (PGRs may only be filed during the first 9 months of an issued patent’s life.)13 IPRs, 
on the other hand, are valid against all kinds of patents, including the life sciences and physical 
sciences patents that make up the bulk of the TTO docket. The IPR proceeding is also important 
to consider because it was the subject of two different Supreme Court rulings in the 2017-2018 
term, one of which specifically affirmed it as constitutional.14 
 
7 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29.  
8 35 U.S.C. § 321.  
9 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19. The legacy Ex Parte Re-exam procedure still remains in effect after the AIA, but among 
other differences, does not involve the participation of the third party and proceeds before the USPTO examiner 
rather than the PTAB.  
10 Morgan & Sandoval, supra note 4 at 7.  
11 Christopher Arnold, The AIA and TTOS: How Technology Transfer Offices Can Best Handle the Changes in 
Patent Law Brought about by the America Invents Act, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 417 (2012).  
12 A chart comparing the requirements and characteristics of each proceeding is at USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/.../aia_trial_comparison_chart.pptx (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).  
13 TTOs usually file patents over very early stage technology, so their patents will likely not be commercialized and 
thus ripe for an IPR attack during the relevant period for a PGR.  
14 In Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018), the Supreme Court considered 
whether it was a violation of Article III or the seventh amendment right to a jury trial for a patent owner to lose 
patent rights by having its invalidity determination adjudicated in an administrative PTAB proceeding rather than an 
Article III court, as would happen in a patent infringement lawsuit. Ultimately the Supreme Court found the IPR 
proceeding constitutional because the patent rights were “public rights” derived from common law and granted by 
an administrative body (the USPTO), which could maintain control over the decision of whether that grant was 
correct. However, the Supreme Court specifically stated that it was not ruling on the possibility that IPRs might be 
considered unconstitutional under the Due Process clause, the Takings clause, or that IPRs might not apply 
 
 
The comments that provide the information in this Chapter come from telephone 
interviews with TTO offices performed in June and August of 2018. The subjects interviewed 
represented 18 TTOs,15 from large and small public and private universities, a few of which were 
part of a larger university system. I chose my list of interviewees to include active TTO offices, 
which were recommended by other interviewees as being leaders in the TTO community, that 
could provide a sampling of different-sized offices, different-sized universities, and both public 
and private institutions. Although I did not plan the survey to be exhaustive or completely 
inclusive, the fact that the answers were vastly consistent across the sample indicate to me that 
the answers to my questions are likely illustrative of the answers of many other TTOs.  
In each case the employees at the TTO designated the person that I should speak to who 
was most knowledgeable about IPRs. Although the titles of each of the representatives I 
interviewed varied (as did the hierarchical structure of the TTO), generally I spoke to either the 
head of licensing for the TTO or to the highest ranking legal officer for the TTO. In a few cases I 
spoke to more than one person within the TTO—for example, when my questions crossed 
between the expertise of two people, or when the highest ranking person with the relevant 
information was relatively new to the office.  
I started each interview with the same list of questions, eliciting information about the 
TTO’s overall sense of worry about IPRs, how many IPRs the TTO had experienced (and under 
which circumstances), and if the TTO had changed i) filing; ii) licensing; iii) budgeting or iv) 
enforcement policies, procedures, or strategy because of the possibility of IPRs. I also asked if 
they had noticed positive or negative changes in licensing success that they could attribute to 
IPRs. In each case, I typed written notes during the interview, taking down answers word-for-
word whenever possible to allow for direct quotations. Some of the TTOs requested that their 
comments remain anonymous or that the statistics be reported in aggregate form. In most cases, 
this desire was because the TTOs had active IPR proceedings, or because they were concerned 
about potential licensors or potential patent challengers learning about their attitudes toward 
enforcement or other policies. As a result, while the statements below are direct quotations from 
the interviews, I do not attribute the comments to the specific TTO that made them. 
 
III. How are IPRs affecting TTO policies and procedures?  
 
A. IPRs present more risk to TTOs in theory than in reality  
 
Across the board, the TTOs I interviewed are concerned about the effects IPRs are having 
on their practice. They worry that IPRs leave their assets vulnerable to attack from better funded 
commercial players. They fear that IPRs will tilt the license negotiation in the licensee’s favor, 
because the licensee can threaten to file an IPR if they cannot get good license terms. And they 
claim that IPRs are contributing to a broad devaluing of patents across the board, because of the 
uncertainty they inject into the system where a patent can be declared invalid at any point in its 
 
retroactively to patents that issued before IPRs were instituted. The other court case to consider IPRs was SAS 
Institute v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), where the Supreme Court ruled that upon instituting an IPR, the USPTO 
was required to consider all claims that were challenged in the IPR, not just some of the claims.  
15 I interviewed the TTO at Arizona State University; University of California, Berkeley; University of California, 
Irvine; University of California, Los Angeles; Columbia University; Duke University; University of Florida; 
Harvard University; Johns Hopkins University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; University of Michigan; 
University of Minnesota; University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; University of Texas at Arlington; 
University of Wisconsin-Madison; Washington University; and Yale University.  
 
 
life. They mention that the effect of IPRs is not what was intended by Congress; that instead of 
empowering parties to winnow weaker patents, that IPR is being used as a litigation tactic to 
drive settlement and avoid having to pay for infringement. One summed up the situation by 
stating that IPRs “have added another burden to commercialization,” and another stated that IPRs 
are “part of a net negative . . . it really benefits everyone to have certainty on who owns patents 
and whether they are strong. Confusion makes it harder. All of these strategies and issues make it 
harder to get product out and to benefit the university.”  
However, curiously, the TTOs’ worry has not translated into significant policy or 
procedural changes. Overall, the survey comments showed that the expectation of deleterious 
IPR effects on TTOs was much worse than the reality. In response to even perceived risk, TTOs 
have implemented only small changes, if any at all. In addition, for a variety of reasons IPRs 
have not affected TTOs’ licensing success. This section will first address why TTOs might be 
worried about IPRs before postulating as to why the reality of IPRs does not match the 
expectation in the TTO setting, and therefore why TTOs can feel justified that they have made 
very few changes in policy.  
It makes sense to be intimidated by the prospect of IPRs for a variety of reasons. First, 
the exposure is comprehensive. No patent is immune from IPR challenge, so long as it has been 
issued for at least nine months. Any third party may file an IPR, regardless of whether they are 
an accused infringer and regardless of whether the patent owner has filed suit.  
Second, IPR procedures give distinct advantages to a patent challenger over a patent 
owner. It is substantially cheaper to file an IPR than for the patent owner to defend it.16 
Moreover, the challenger can choose specific claims to attempt to invalidate, and estoppel only 
applies to claims for which the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) issues a written 
opinion.17 This means that the challenger may have several chances to challenge the patent 
(albeit different claims), and may in fact challenge the patent on other grounds, should the patent 
owner later file a patent infringement suit.18  
Third, when an IPR challenge is used within the context of a litigation, the shift in the 
balance of power toward the patent challenger will affect the whole litigation strategy. If an IPR 
is timely filed, the judge in the patent infringement litigation will often stay the court case 
pending resolution of the IPR. Although the IPR will be resolved in no more than 12 months, this 
stay delays the adjudication of the infringement case and can also distract counsel and add 
greatly to legal fees. Although the effect of the USPTO’s rulemaking changing the review 
standard of patent claims in the IPR context remains to be seen, IPRs have almost always 
invalidated at least one claim of a challenged patent, and they are commonly successful in 
invalidating the entire patent.19 Because of the advantages granted the challenger under an IPR, 
 
16 Neal Solomon, The Problem of Inter-Partes Review, IP WATCHDOG, Aug. 8, 2017, (”In addition to the procedural 
issues, IPRs introduced an asymmetric component which particularly burdens the patent holder by requiring a very 
expensive ten-fold higher cost to defend the patent in the PTAB relative to the alleged infringer(s) cost of initiating 
an IPR.”). 
17 35 U.S.C. §315(e)(1).  
18 The SAS Institute case (supra note 14) and recent USPTO rule making (effective for IPRs filed after November 
13, 2018) have leveled the playing field between patent holders and challengers substantially. The SAS case 
mandates that the PTAB review all claims challenged in the IPR, and the USPTO rule making now aligns the 
standard of review for claim interpretation and burden of proof used in IPRs with the standard used in the federal 
courts. This erases a former advantage for patent challengers, who were able to enjoy a broader claim interpretation 
and lower standard of proof for invalidity in PTAB procedures, and a narrower claim interpretation and higher 
standard of proof when fighting infringement in federal court.       
19 Schwartz, supra note 3.  
 
 
TTOs might think twice about enforcement, since any cease and desist letter might result in an 
IPR being filed. Although an IPR is always possible, it is ever more likely in the context of a 
patent infringement litigation. 
The possibility of an IPR can be quite intimidating. However, the reality for TTOs has 
been quite different. The reality is that the number of IPRs being filed against TTO patents is 
remarkably small. In the seven years since the IPR procedure was implemented, even as other 
patent owners have experienced an explosion in IPR proceedings,20 half of the TTOs interviewed 
(n = 9) had not yet had their patents subject to even one IPR.21 This is especially remarkable 
considering not only the vast numbers of patents filed by these TTOs, but also the fact that 
several of the TTOs reported that they were involved in an active litigation, where an IPR 
challenge would be more likely. Of the half of the TTOs familiar with IPRs, many had 
experienced only three or fewer proceedings. And for the few TTOs that had experienced more 
than three IPRs, many of those IPRs were clustered into either one or two large litigations. No 
TTO I interviewed reported that they had had more than four active cases that involved IPRs.  
The numbers may be particularly low because the chance of IPR success over TTO 
patents may be less than normal. TTOs must file early-stage patents both because they are 
covering the raw research subject matter of university labs and because TTOs often have to file 
patents early to beat an inventor’s disclosure deadline. In order to preserve patent rights, the 
university may need to file patents earlier than industry counterparts, sometimes before full data 
gathering is complete. These early-stage patents may have enablement risk, but they are so early 
stage that there is also less likely to be prior art that could invalidate them. Since IPRs invalidate 
through prior art, the early stage of the patented matter may be an advantage.  
An IPR challenge to a TTO patent is also less likely because of the TTO mission. 
Because TTOs focus much more on protection and licensing than on enforcement of their 
patents, many improbable conditions need to align for an IPR to proceed against a university 
patent. Patent challengers generally file IPRs in one of two scenarios: i) the patent owner has 
accused the challenger of infringement and the IPR is a defense; or ii) the patent presents a 
significant freedom to operate risk to the challenger’s commercialization, and licensing is not an 
option. The TTOs I interviewed enforce their patents very rarely; many of them consider 
enforcement outside the core mission of a TTO. As a result, the likelihood of a TTO filing an 
infringement lawsuit and sparking an IPR is low. Likewise, for a TTO patent to meet the second 
condition through creating a large freedom to operate risk, the patent would either have to cover 
valuable seminal technology, or the technology or science would have to be developed enough 
that a challenger would know they could not design around it when commercializing. In addition, 
the challenger would have to have either been unable or unwilling to license from the TTO, and 
yet must be so convinced of infringement risk that they are willing to invest thousands of dollars 
 
20 Mark A. Lemley, supra note 5, at 5-6 (citing Brian Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look 
at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 94–97 (2014)); see Morgan Lewis, 2018 PTAB Digest: The Latest 
Trends and Developments in Post-Grant Proceedings, LEXOLOGY, June 3, 2018, at 10, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0da05dd9-8d41-450a-91af-
4cae770d2ceb&utm_source=lexology+daily+newsfeed&utm_medium=html+email+-+body+-
+general+section&utm_campaign=aipla+2013+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=lexology+daily+newsfeed+20
18-07-05&utm_term.  
21 It is worth noting that in all the IPRs we discussed, the TTOs and their universities were on the defensive; no 
single TTO had launched an IPR offensively. This fits with the university mission as licensor of IP instead of 
commercial venture.  
 
 
 
into attacking the patent prophylactically, thereby tipping their hand to the TTO to the probable 
infringement risk in the process. Given the early stage of most patented university technologies, 
these prerequisites all occurring together is extremely unlikely.  
And finally, even should a TTO face an IPR, they have two possible built-in defenses that 
keep the risk low. First, the TTOs of public universities may be able to completely shelter their 
patents from attack through a sovereign immunity defense. And second, most TTOs—from both 
public and private universities—face little or no risk of funding the IPR defense in all but the 
most unusual of conditions. 
Because the 11th Amendment protects states from federal suit, if IPRs are considered 
suits and state-run universities are considered arms of the state, public universities can invoke the 
defense of sovereign immunity to avoid IPRs completely. Two recent cases before the PTAB, 
namely Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fl. Research Foundation Inc.22 and NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of 
Md., Baltimore,23 each established that sovereign immunity properly shielded the university 
patents from IPR, even though (as in NeoChord) the motion to dismiss the IPR came after the 
IPR had been instituted,24 and importantly after the state university had participated in the IPR. 
There are still some questions about applying the sovereign immunity defense, among them 
whether participation in a full patent infringement lawsuit waives sovereign immunity25 and 
whether tribal immunity (which has been ruled not to be a defense to IPR) and sovereign 
immunity are analogous for these purposes or not.26 But for now, sovereign immunity is a valid 
defense that state universities can use to defend their patent assets from IPRs.  
Regardless of the outcome of the state sovereign immunity issue, universities still will 
only fund IPR defenses in only the most unusual of circumstances. In most cases, a challenger 
will only file an IPR over patents with proven economic value, which usually means after the 
patent’s technology or science has been commercialized. Since the university does not 
commercialize patents itself, the patents ripe for IPR attack are almost always covered under 
license. The university license terms almost always mandate that the licensee cover the cost of 
enforcement, so even should the worst case IPR scenario happen, the university does not pay for 
defending its patent. So the cost of defense would only be an issue for the university under 
special circumstances—for example, if the patent at issue is unlicensed, or licensed 
nonexclusively such that no one licensee must bear the defense cost, or if the licensee could not 
afford the enforcement and the university wanted to step in to fund it.  
For all these reasons, the reality of IPRs might have been expected to not match the hype. 
But I was curious to know if just the possibility of more IPR proceedings being filed has 
nonetheless changed how TTOs do business.  
 
B. TTOs reveal the effect of IPRs on filing, licensing, enforcement, and 
budgeting  
 
22 Case No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 21 (PTAB, Jan. 25, 2017).  
23 Case No. IPR2016-00208, Paper 28 (PTAB, May 23, 2017).  
24 Stephen Gardner, Nikia Gray, & Bryce Loken, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Dismisses Second Inter Partes 
Review of University Patent on Sovereign Immunity Grounds, QUARLES AND BRADY LLP, May 25, 2017, 
https://www.quarles.com/nikia-l-gray/publications-and-presentations/patent-trial-and-appeal-board-dismisses-
second-inter-partes-review-of-university-patent-on-sovereign-immunity-grounds/.  
25 This question is at the heart of Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp., case number 18-1559, on 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit, with arguments heard on March 11, 2019.  
26 The case deciding against tribal immunity defense was Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al. v. Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe IPR2016-01127, -01128, -01129, -01130, -01131, -01132. 
 
 
 
After getting a general sense of the level of concern that TTOs had surrounding IPRs, and 
about how many IPRs they had experienced, I asked a series of questions to illuminate whether 
and how the possibility of IPRs had changed how TTOs were doing business, including whether 
they had changed their policies and procedures. I asked them to respond in four categories: 
whether IPRs had changed anything about their i) patent filing strategies; ii) licensing practices 
or results; iii) willingness to enforce their patents; and iv) budgeting. The answers to these 
questions are relayed below. 
 
1. “Have IPRs caused you to change your patent filing strategies?”  
 
Given the possibility of IPRs, TTOs might be tempted to refocus their patent filing, 
limiting filing to areas where IPRs are less common.27 They might also perform more exhaustive 
prior art searches during prosecution to potentially inoculate their patents against IPR challenge. 
However, the survey responses showed neither to be the case. TTOs were deeply opposed to the 
first idea, and they dismissed the second idea out of hand. However, some TTOs did suggest they 
are making subtle changes to their filing practices to attempt to ready their patents for IPR 
challenge.  
Every TTO interviewed felt strongly that it was a critical part of their mission to protect 
all the patentable university inventions that might have a chance of being licensed and 
commercialized. They were therefore very opposed to making decisions on what to file or not 
file based on subject matter of the patent rather than on other factors. They were even somewhat 
offended at the suggestion:  
 
We are fortunate because we are healthy financially, and we can act as the service 
organization we are and attend to faculty needs, and we can patent when the idea is 
protectable, as opposed to worrying about if it might be subject to an IPR. 
 
We have money and resources and have always approached filings as more of a 
commitment to the technology transfer mission and less about tactics or profit margin. 
For us, when I picture 8 years ago, 2 years, ago and now—IPRs have not changed filing 
or licensing decisions.  
 
TTOs hedge their bets best when they file at least provisional patents on every invention 
that has enough data to support an application. Because TTOs never know where the next great 
commercial success will come from and do not have enough information at the start of the 
process to understand whether a patent will become valuable, they say they would never pick and 
choose among fields merely on account of an increased risk of IPR.  
Rather than avoiding certain subject matter to attempt to avoid IPRs, TTOs instead said 
they preferred to focus on ensuring that individual patent filings were as strong as they could be. 
 
27 Early reports stated that most patents being challenged (71.8%) were in electronics and the computer arts. Berdine 
& Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 17 (citing Christopher Douglas, et al., Inter Partes Review - One Year Later, ALSTON 
& BIRD LLP (Sept. 17, 2013)).  
 
 
For example, they file patents with as much supporting data as possible given publication 
constraints and first to file concerns.28 They avoid filing cover sheet provisionals whenever 
possible, and they make the claims of each provisional application as robust as possible. But they 
will also admit that these policies are not new. As one TTO explained, filing more complete 
patents is not a change brought about by the possibility of IPR, or even by the first to file 
provisions of the AIA, but is what TTOs have been trying to do for a while to protect their 
patents from attacks based on invalidity. The IPR and other AIA changes just make filing 
stronger patents even more of a priority:  
 
I could see how some TTOs might use IPRs as a factor when looking at whether to 
protect computer inventions, etc. because those patents might be more susceptible 
to attack. Maybe you file less aggressively in that area. But it’s rare that we make 
decisions not to file at all because of IPRs, both because we always file everything, and 
also because we have always handled all invalidation issues by just making sure the 
prosecution is as full as possible. IPRs haven’t changed how we feel.  
 
As to doing more prior art searching, generally, TTOs do not believe that more extensive 
prior art searches will inoculate their patents from IPR challenge. First, since the patents they file 
are over such early-stage technology, the likelihood of there being any other prior art knocking 
out the patent on newness grounds is already low. And should the prior art exist, the fields of 
invention are so insular that the inventors would likely already know about any other potential 
prior art. And although it is not legally relevant, some TTOs depend on professional journals’ 
high standards for publication to give them insight into nonobviousness considerations. Since the 
TTOs are also generally strapped for resources, given the probable low risk of prior art citations, 
and given that some TTOs are worried about the results of a prior art search or a freedom-to-
operate opinion (“FTO”) being discoverable, TTOs are not shifting to expend more money on 
prior art searches. Unless IPRs become a more pervasive problem for TTOs, this is unlikely to 
change.  
Further, the TTOs argue that not only would it be near impossible to judge which patents 
would be more vulnerable to IPR attack based on subject matter, but to make judgments about 
what to patent based on that analysis would be extremely unwise. They state that the better goal 
is to focus on filing inventions that will lead to strong patents, where there is (as best they can 
tell) a market to be licensed and commercialized.  
 
Standard operating procedure on how we evaluate IP is based on whether the invention as 
disclosed has good potential market value. It ends up being a much bigger question 
than patentability. Our budget is small—we can only afford to protect what has good 
prognosis for market. We look at what the tech is, who the players are in the field, 
what the product would be under the invention, whether it is something based on market 
research that people are likely to buy. A lot of black magic really—you do your best to 
figure out what the market would be. If it looks like a problem recognized in the field 
and that people would buy it, then we file a provisional. Then we market to companies 
we identify and others, or if it’s good tech for a startup, we license there. If there’s no 
interest at all, we might recommend not to pursue the non-provisional. Or sometimes we 
 
28 Although this may not be as helpful in an IPR setting, because IPRs are based on Section 102 and 103 challenges, 
which are countered best by early filing. 
 
 
might think we have early technology, and the market is not ready; if we really think it 
could be important in market, we might file [a non-provisional application] anyway even 
without interest.  
  
TTOs also make the valid point that they would never want to entirely avoid the risk of 
an IPR challenge by shying away from filing a patent that they think might be commercially 
successful. The patents that might attract an IPR are exactly the patents that TTOs should want to 
prioritize filing. Since there is a positive correlation between risk of IPR and commercial 
success, TTOs may favor filing the patents that might end up being most IPR-worthy.  
 
Frankly, anything that makes it to the commercialization stage, you are going to 
get IPR’d. We will deal with it when we get there—there WILL be an IPR. The 
likelihood of IPR is going to be based on whether [the patent] has commercial potential, 
not on the strength of the patent. Regardless of what’s been filed or not filed, they will 
attack. [IPRs are] like inventorship issues. When tens of millions of dollars are at risk, 
this [IPR] is just another tool.  
 
Rather than the risk of IPR, when choosing which patents to file, TTOs are influenced 
much more by their concern over whether the patents will issue, given confusion around 
patentable subject matter and changes under the AIA that broaden what constitutes prior art and 
disclosure. TTOs describe IPR as being so sufficiently “downstream” that changing filing 
strategy based on a worry about IPRs seems a luxury when the patent will conceivably face so 
many challenges before it will even issue:  
 
We base our filing decisions on prior art, the path to patent, but because we have limited 
budgets, we can’t do a detailed patentability analysis. An IPR is so downstream, it 
doesn’t impact the upstream decision on what to patent.  
 
For the most part, we don’t really think about IPRs that much. We think about allowance 
and validity, but not specifically IPRs. . . . Definitely feels like we are doing 
more provisionals, just to get that priority date, and preserve the international rights. . . . 
It is not IPRs that are pushing us—we don’t think of it as that—tend to think about it as 
good prosecution. [IPRs are] just one more thing that we consider when we enforce and 
when we have our patents granted.  
 
In sum, the risk of an IPR does not guide which patents TTOs choose to file. In fact, 
TTOs might be happy to have a patent in the portfolio that someday is deemed IPR-worthy, 
because it would be a strong patent with commercial value that is worth enforcing and 
challenging. 
The one change in some TTOs’ filing strategy is not about what patents to file, but 
tactically how to maneuver during prosecution. Borrowing from corporate practice, some TTOs 
are now filing multiple continuations for some of their most valuable patents, or splitting claims 
across several patents to keep a set of patent claims alive. These claim sets are then able to be 
revised as necessary if challenged through IPR: 
 
 
 
Universities file very early in the product life cycle and the patent process; it’s really hard 
at that early point to position yourself against IPRs, so relying on continuations helps 
somewhat. If there were no IPRs, we would have a much thicker claim set. Continuations 
allow more flexibility to address the IPR; you can pivot to other claims to avoid the 
argument, if you keep the [patent] family alive. . . . With IPR, we now take a better look 
at continuation practice. We used to file continuations much more sparingly.  
 
This is of course not an option for every TTO, and certainly not an option for every 
patent family or even most families within a TTO’s portfolio. But continuation practice might be 
one helpful strategy to guard against challenges to patent validity, including but not limited to 
IPRs. This gives a patent owner a chance to fight back against what many consider a system that 
is slanted toward the benefit of the challenger. As one TTO stated: “Others are also doing the 
same thing in industry—we are taking their lead [in] that there are things you can do to protect 
yourself.”  
 
2. “Have IPRs changed your licensing strategies?”  
 
The threat of an IPR might undermine the value of patents, which might carry over to 
patent licensing negotiations. On the other hand, depending on whether it is upheld, the state 
sovereign immunity defense to IPRs might shift the balance of power back in the other direction, 
since at least public universities might be able to offer a shield to the patents they license. If 
public universities can wield such a defense, that might in turn incentivize would-be licensees to 
license from public universities rather than their private university counterparts. All of these 
changes brought about from IPRs might conceivably force TTOs to alter their licensing 
strategies.  
TTOs do report that licensees’ attitudes toward patent value have in fact shifted. As a 
result, some TTOs are tweaking their licensing strategies around the margins to compensate. 
However, most of the TTOs attribute the shift in attitude more to their potential licensees’ 
business models than to IPRs, especially as concerns patents in the physical sciences. And while 
a state sovereign immunity defense seems helpful in theory, the reality is that it has not yet 
conferred a licensing advantage on public universities, or even tended to affect licensing 
discussions much at all.  
 
i. Some licensees’ assessment of patent value has shifted, although probably not as 
a result of IPRs 
 
To start, most of the TTOs believe that attitudes about patent value have shifted. Some of 
the shift is blamed on IPRs, although most of the evidence for that connection appears to be 
anecdotal and second hand:  
 
We heard from other . . . campuses that prospective licensees can threaten to launch an 
IPR if they can’t get good terms as a negotiation tactic—this is awful! Whenever you 
start off a negotiation and someone is approaching it in such an aggressive way, it 
probably won’t get better as you go on! But we haven’t dealt with IPRs too much.  
 
 
 
There’s a lot of talk too about how high-paying licensees already paying royalties might 
file IPRs to get out of their license, but we have not found that to be the case.  
 
But most of the blame should not be placed on IPRs. TTOs surmise there is a connection 
between how much value a licensee confers on the patent and why the licensee is seeking to 
license the patent in the first place:  
 
IPRs have impacted our ability to do business with established well-resourced 
businesses—they now increasingly look at IP through a slightly different lens. They look 
at assets as being helpful if they create an exclusive niche in the market, but if they are 
licensing just to prevent infringement, they are much less interested. It is even worse 
now, because they have a cheaper route to push back with IPRs. It has changed their 
perspective on the need to secure the patent, especially in the context of a freedom to 
operate.  
 
So licensees that are hoping to sell a product based on the patents value those licensed 
patents more. Although IPRs are making a situation worse, perhaps only this certain subset of 
licensees—those that intend to commercialize the patent they are licensing—are really hoping 
for the patents they license to hold long-term value. Licensees that license in order to clear a 
freedom to operate hurdle do not mind if a third party challenges the patent they have licensed. 
Should the patent be proven invalid, provided the license allows termination upon such a finding, 
they can stop paying license fees.29 Since a sizeable percentage of the pool of licensees falls into 
the “freedom to operate” category, this could contribute to why licensees tend not to consider 
IPR risk when deciding whether to license and for how much.  
 
In addition, TTOs believe that licensing has become more difficult because in certain 
industries patents hold less value than in others. While a patent can serve as the entire basis for a 
life science company’s value, in the physical sciences, one patent is far less valuable. As a result, 
TTOs report that companies in the physical sciences industries tend to want to wait to be sued 
before they license a patent. Given that physical sciences companies create products that each 
could contain dozens if not hundreds or thousands of patents, infringement of any one patent 
(particularly a university patent which could be very early stage) is hard to prove, and since 
licenses to those patents tend to be nonexclusive anyway, a physical sciences company may 
make the decision to infringe rather than license: 
 
It is more common to have [licensing] problems in the physical sciences than in life 
sciences. This is because most deals in life sciences are exclusive licenses, which carves 
out a niche. In physical science, it is much more about cross licensing, not an exclusive 
license. . . . It is not universal in the physical sciences, but especially in electronics, we 
 
29 This assumes that the challenger is a third party. Many TTOs have provisions in their licenses that either terminate 
the license should the licensee challenge the patent, regardless of outcome, or keep the license active but 
automatically double or treble the license fees.  
 
 
are usually offering licenses to incremental tech in areas where they already have a 
foothold. They are just not that interested in licensing.  
 
A lot of large companies now seem to have a blanket policy not to license. [IPRs are] 
possibly part of it, but more probably it’s an aggregate lessening of value for patents. It is 
near impossible for us to get an injunction. It is hard for us to get large damages. Physical 
science companies are also getting savvy about whether patents matter to their industries. 
They have many more patents in any one invention, and the patents are over incremental 
changes. The perception might be different maybe for life sciences, but physical science 
companies are taking the risk—“come and get me.”  
 
All of these reasons add up to why many licensees of university patents may not ascribe 
as much value to the patents as they should. This has very little to do with the possibility of IPRs.  
 
ii. Some TTOs have compensated for the reluctance to license through portfolio 
licensing and careful pricing  
 
Given that many TTOs are not willing or able to enforce their patents against infringers 
(for a variety of reasons discussed more in the next section below), this new reality of “efficient 
infringement” challenges TTOs to develop new licensing strategies. One inventive response—
especially in the realm of the physical sciences—is to group patents together into portfolios to 
facilitate simultaneous patent licensing (especially in conjunction with enforcement after a patent 
has been infringed). This model acknowledges the reality that it is possible to build a life 
sciences company around licensing one particular patent, but that for a physical sciences 
company, licensing a portfolio of patents might be more enticing or even necessary:  
 
The licensing models for the two departments (medical school and engineering school) 
are different. For example, a small molecule patent—you can build a company around 
it—it is easier to commercialize. But engineering improvements are smaller; you 
wouldn’t build a company around them. We can get more revenue from a medical school 
patent because it is easier to build a company, easier to commercialize around it. It is 
more challenging for an engineering company. To deal with this, our new model is 
pooling engineering patents into a group and licensing as a group. We create a patent 
pool and license in a bundle.  
 
It would be great if we [life sciences licensing officers] could get a portfolio, but in 
[another licensing officer’s] space, it is much more of a concern. He works in magnetic 
resonance and wireless communications, and he is developing portfolios that he doesn’t 
just proactively license, it’s [also] . . . a litigation play.  
 
And in addition to licensing portfolios of patents, TTOs are also carefully considering the 
point of view of more reluctant licensees when they price their royalties. Especially in the 
physical sciences where the perceived risk of enforcement is low, and especially when the 
licensee is interested in licensing in order to get freedom to operate, TTOs are looking to hit a 
“sweet spot” that is low enough that the licensee is still willing to pay to close off all risk of 
infringement: 
 
 
 
We do proceed with greater sensitivity in that we have modified what we would ask for 
in license fees. If the fees are too high, particularly in an FTO [freedom to operate] 
license situation, that raises the risk of IPR. We try to hit that sweet spot—especially with 
FTO—where we want them to pay just enough. Too much, and they may challenge the 
patent.  
 
In this way, TTOs are trying to meet the licensee where they are, changing their policies 
somewhat to accommodate. But this has much less to do with IPRs than with the needs and 
expectations of the particular licensees.  
 
iii. The effect of a sovereign immunity defense to an IPR is still uncertain, but so far 
it seems to be only minimally relevant as a negotiation point  
 
Is the prospect of sovereign immunity as a defense to IPR a valuable negotiation point for 
universities? When the Covidien case30 was first decided, TTOs of some public universities 
assumed not only that their patents could be shielded from this attack on validity, but that the 
shield could prove a valuable negotiation point with future licensees. Assuming the sovereign 
immunity defense could be imputed over to a licensee,31 the licensed patents could be 
completely inoculated from at least one form of attack. The public universities were not the only 
parties discussing this possibility; various commentators were mentioning the issue,32 and there 
was also a lot of industry buzz:  
 
Something that has gotten a lot of attention—not so much made an impact, but gotten a 
lot of attention—is around the sovereign immunity cases, where public universities are 
immune from IPRs unless they sue first. . . . Some journalists were calling, law firms 
were offering congratulations, and the general counsel told us we might expect some 
attention.  
 
Private universities also took notice. If IPRs were going to have a big effect on patent 
values and therefore on licensing success, a defense of sovereign immunity to IPRs could prove 
to be very important. The fact that only some TTOs could take advantage of the defense was a 
bit troubling, since it might also have created an imbalance in the community. But overall, 
although TTOs noted that any possible defense against IPRs would be helpful, they did not 
expect that sovereign immunity was going to be a driver for more successful licensing.  
For one thing, an IPR is only one method to invalidate a patent, and other methods are 
not subject to the defense.  
 
 
30 Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research Foundation Inc., Case No. IPR2016-01274, Paper 21, (PTAB, Jan. 
25, 2017).  
31 This is an undecided question. As held in Reactive Surfaces Ltd, LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 1:14-CV-1009-
LY, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106796 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2015), a sovereign immunity defense cannot be imputed 
over to a patent co-owner; in that case, an IPR was allowed to continue against the co-owner even as it was 
dismissed against the state university. However as of this writing, it has not been decided in court if a licensee can 
be protected from IPR by virtue of the licensor state university‘s sovereign immunity.  
32 See, e.g., Gardner, Gray, & Loken, supra note 24.  
 
 
Even without the IPR process, there are still ways to invalidate a patent; [sovereign 
immunity] doesn’t foreclose the opportunity to invalidate, it just changes litigation 
strategy. IPR is still a strong tool, so [the defense] is still worth something, but not so 
much. . . . In a nutshell, being able to foreclose an IPR option is helpful (valuable) but not 
dispositive.  
 
In addition, the case law around sovereign immunity and IPR is still developing. There 
are many untested aspects of the sovereign immunity argument that may undermine its power as 
an IPR defense.33 For example, although sovereign immunity clearly applies to state universities 
as patent owners, it might be a personal defense.34 It is less sure that sovereign immunity can be 
commuted over to protect the licensee of a patent owned by the state university. It is also not 
sure that sovereign immunity applies at all when the TTO is a nonprofit entity affiliated with a 
state university (as is the case with the University of Wisconsin) rather than an arm of the state 
university itself. Also untested is the question of when and under what conditions the state 
university loses whatever sovereign immunity defense it had; for example, whether the 
university loses its defense if it proactively files suit against the challenger for infringement.35 
And finally, in a recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”) determined that tribal immunity did not apply to shield a patent from an IPR 
proceeding.36 Although the state university TTOs can distinguish their missions easily from that 
of the Native American tribe in question in the case, that case might be seen to represent a 
weakening of the sovereign immunity defense in general. All of this uncertainty could undermine 
the value of the defense as a bargaining chip. In particular, should the state sovereign immunity 
defense be waived once the university files suit against the infringer, then the defense is worth 
less to the licensee, who can only use it so long as he does not enforce the patent.  
 
So at the PTAB, sovereign immunity can be used as a defense. But if you file suit, you 
waive those rights (potentially). So it becomes a difficult sell as a bargaining chip—you 
can’t bring suit, so how is it a good defense? 
 
Sovereign immunity might also be inapplicable to any one license situation because it 
might not be possible to choose between licensing opportunities. Most technologies are unique to 
the university. While a defense of sovereign immunity offered by a public institution might be 
compelling, if the technology the licensee needs was created at a private university, that is where 
the licensee will execute the license. As one TTO explained, different offices are not necessarily 
in competition with each other. Licensees will license the patents that they think they can 
commercialize, regardless of who owns them:  
 
 
33 Sovereign Immunity Growing as Inter Partes Defense, Effect on Licensing Terms Unclear, 11 TECH. TRANSFER 
TACTICS 7 (July 2017), https://www.quarles.com/content/uploads/2017/07/Technology-Transfer-Tactics-July-2017-
Reprint-Sovereign-Immunity.pdf. 
34 Id. (citing interview with Dan Venglarik).  
35 In Ericcson v. Regents of the University of Minnesota IPR IPR2017-01186 -01197 -01200 -01213 -01214 -01219, 
the PTAB denied the University of Minnesota’s motions to dismiss the pending IPRs on sovereign immunity 
grounds because U. Minnesota had sued Ericcson for patent infringement. This case is pending on appeal before the 
CAFC.  
36 Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al., supra note 26. 
 
 
We don’t think about other universities as our competitors. If you want our tech, license. 
You might not be able to get the same tech somewhere else. CRISPR is at X—if you 
want it, go there. When a company looks at three competing technologies, they are not 
deciding on who offers the best deal, and even if they choose the best deal, it is probably 
not about the IPR. It’s about “can they commercialize or not?”  
 
And finally, since IPRs only come into play later in the life of the patent when the 
technology has become a successful product, for licensees, potential defenses to IPRs may seem 
very distant and at the very least lower in priority. The chance of IPR seems so far removed from 
the present that IPRs are not on the minds of even the savviest and most forward-thinking 
licensee. As TTOs explained, most licensees are primarily focused on whether the patent is going 
to grant at all:  
 
IPR does not drive [licensing]—I haven’t heard a licensee say, “we would like to partner 
with you, but we are concerned about withstanding a challenge.” Much more the 
question—“is this thing going to issue?” 
 
IPR is typically not an issue unless you are dealing with an exceptional patent that is 
productized. It is not high on the list of priorities for a licensee, because IPRs only hit 
when the patent and product are hot.  
 
And as TTOs from public universities hungry to use sovereign immunity as a selling 
point say is a sobering thought, most of their licensees do not even know what an IPR is, let 
alone how sovereign immunity might defend their patent asset. A large percentage of TTO 
licenses are executed with start-up companies, which are often unrepresented or have counsel 
that do not know much about IP. And even if they know that IPR can affect their patent’s value, 
often smaller companies are licensing their own inventions back from the university, so they are 
confident in the newness and nonobviousness of their invention. They view licensing as a means 
to a commercialization ends rather than an investment in the value of the patent. As a 
consequence, the sovereign immunity defense does not seem relevant to them. Far from being a 
differentiator, in a license negotiation, TTOs are finding that licensees do not even understand 
the concept:  
 
But in reality, startup licensees are not even thinking about substantive rights when they 
license—they are thinking: what does investor want to see, and what will help me make 
money. It’s almost as if the licensee is checking the box. Do they have the ability to 
practice and a clean chain of title? They might not actually look at the patents, let alone 
get into the weeds of the rights.  
 
They are small companies—they don’t understand patent law and how it works—they 
understand they need patents, but don’t understand the sovereign immunity or IPR 
process or what that means. It is surprising to find that small company licensees just 
aren’t very sophisticated regarding IP and don’t use outside attorneys, and even if they 
do, those attorneys don’t understand IP issues. I was surprised when I came—coming 
from large pharma, I was used to people that understood IP. With these little companies it 
doesn’t seem to have as much value.  
 
 
 
In sum, public university TTOs report that they will sometimes bring up the concept of 
IPRs and a sovereign immunity defense to IPRs. But the topics are seldom brought up by the 
licensee, and never become important to bargaining in the license negotiation. Licensees will 
occasionally question patent value, but that negotiation point is more focused on whether a 
patent will issue, and its value to overall commercialization. Public universities may hope that 
the sovereign immunity defense to IPR will take on greater importance in the future, potentially 
as licensees become more aware, and the case law settles. But for now, sovereign immunity has 
not resulted in additional licensees, nor sparked more successful negotiation results.  
 
We have never had a person bring that up. It’s a theoretical argument, like we are usually 
playing checkers with licensees and this argument is from 3D chess. Licensees have to 
have a lot of things in a row, they are thinking about a lot of stuff. [An IPR defense] 
would be a lot to consider.  
 
I haven’t seen any budge in licensing, but 90% of our licensees probably have no idea 
about that aspect of the law. It’s a pretty rare case that we are licensing to a sophisticated 
and large entity.  
 
The big name companies probably [understand]. But there could be a disconnect between 
their business development folks and their legal team. I am not sure that the awareness of 
legal has percolated. Similarly, we are aware of the issue, but we haven’t brought it to the 
forefront of strategy in our business dealings. I have heard other speakers at conferences 
mention that third parties have raised the issue with them in meetings. I wouldn’t be 
surprised if it came up in the future for us. 
 
I have talked to some licensees about sovereign immunity issues. Having IP in the name 
of the university rather than in name of licensee if we are doing a sponsored research 
agreement might be helpful to them. Mostly have [only] used it in the negotiation, but I 
am not sure of the effect of it. Some licensees still insist they have to own the IP no 
matter what—some say they want to jointly own. So [sovereign immunity] is probably 
not instrumental in completing deals, but we are bringing it up. 
 
iv. Sovereign immunity is similarly not driving any shift in business model 
 
Because the defense of sovereign immunity could protect against IPRs, looking at the 
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe facts for inspiration, it seems like there might be an opportunity for 
public universities to develop a cottage industry as a patent holding company. Since the Saint 
Regis case was narrowly construed to interpret tribal as opposed to state immunity in the context 
of an IPR defense, it might be possible for state universities to take assignments to third party 
patents in order to shield them from IPR attack. One TTO explained that they had in fact been 
approached, but that they refused to go down that path, based on a conflict with the TTO 
mission:  
 
People [have] called me up asking to assign patents to [university]—I said no—we don’t 
want to be in that business. Some faculty thought this was a good monetization idea. But 
 
 
our administration said no; we are for research and education. Our outcome is sometimes 
patents, and we will defend sometimes, but we didn’t want to shift to this model.  
 
So even if courts do not extend the Saint Regis tribal immunity holding to state sovereign 
immunity actors, TTOs reported they are not interested in shifting their licensing policies and 
procedures in this way.  
 
v. IPR is causing some TTOs to redraft their licensing documents to ensure that 
licensees pay for IPR 
 
One universal truth across the TTOs is that whenever possible, someone else should pay 
to defend  against any IPR. This topic is discussed in more detail in the section related to 
budgeting below, but many TTOs have in fact changed their licensing policies in one way 
because of IPR: they have redrafted their license agreements to more clearly state that if a patent 
is licensed, the licensee is responsible for paying to defend any IPR proceeding.37  
 
Most TTOs have both prosecution and enforcement sections in their license agreements. 
Many TTOs have added IPRs specifically to one or the other section, usually in a way where the 
licensee should front the cost for the defense instead of reimbursing for it. Although the TTOs 
realize that if the patent is licensed to a start-up company that they may not be able to pay that 
cost, like any other costs associated with litigation, the beginning bargaining position is that it 
will be the licensee’s responsibility.  
 
We had to adjust our licensing language—when we license to a company, we put the 
possibility of this expense under the “prosecution” section rather than litigation so that 
the company pays for it.  
 
Generically licensee pays for all patent costs (directly or indirectly), so we assume that 
that includes IPRs. But we did add language after the AIA to explicitly call out the IPR 
process as being under prosecution.  
 
Yes, we have changed the language in the prosecution section to cover IPRs as patent-
related expenses that the licensee is directly reimbursing. But we are also realistic—if 
[licensee is] not a big company, as soon as the expenses start to hit, regardless of what’s 
in the contract, it’s going to be an issue.  
 
Some TTOs did not change their license language because they felt it was already 
sufficiently broad to cover IPR (“No changes to contracting—all locked up already.”). But they 
 
37 Interestingly, forcing the licensee to fund the defense of an IPR can potentially set up a conflict of interest if the 
license is for freedom to operate purposes. It is likely that such a licensee may want the IPR to succeed, and thus 
may not want to defend it, if the IPR would invalidate the university patent and obviate the need for the licensee to 
pay license fees. David Schwartz, Universities Face An Increasing Likelihood Of Inter Partes Reviews, TECH. 
TRANSFER ENEWS BLOG, TEASDALE (Oct 8, 2014), https://techtransfercentral.com/2014/10/08/universities-face-an-
increasing-likelihood-of-inter-partes-reviews/.  
  
 
 
were sure that the expense would be covered. One final TTO is waiting to change its license 
language to specifically cover IPR until the sovereign immunity cases are resolved. Because 
sovereign immunity might turn out to be a complete defense to all IPR challenges, this TTO did 
not feel ready to assume that any party involved with its patents would be responsible for 
funding the defense of an IPR.  
  
3. “Have IPRs changed your patent enforcement?”  
 
Since an IPR proceeding attacks a patent’s validity and costs money to defend, TTOs 
might think twice about enforcing a patent, lest the enforcement attract an IPR. Especially 
because IPRs are most commonly filed against university patents that have been commercialized, 
through enforcement, the TTOs might be opening up their most valuable patents to potential 
challenge. The choice is further complicated by the fact that most of the time the patents that are 
enforced have been licensed to a third party, which controls and will pay for the enforcement. So 
although the patent is the university’s asset, and the TTO will likely weigh in on the decision to 
enforce, it is the licensee that is calling all the day-to-day shots on the enforcement, and on 
defending any filed IPR.  
The interviews revealed that most TTOs do in fact specifically consider the risk of IPRs 
when they consider enforcement, although some TTOs weigh the possibility much more heavily 
than others. One of the more concerned TTOs stated:  
 
It used to be that if you believed there was an infringer, you could send a licensing request 
and at most risk a declaratory judgment, but you now risk an IPR. The financial barrier for 
a company [to file an IPR] is much lower than in litigation, so [IPR] is almost a certainty . 
. . [IPR is implicated in] a limited number of cases, but when it’s relevant, it’s very relevant.  
 
As a result, at least one TTO reports they are extra careful during prosecution to make 
their “assets as impervious to IPRs as possible . . . meeting our duty to disclose, seeing 
that references get properly considered and things like that.” However, even that TTO 
acknowledged that the standard is likely not that different from before because they “were 
always careful because patents could always be challenged.” In addition, other TTOs bemoaned 
their quandary: they wanted to be able to file patents that could resist IPR, but one realized that 
they “can’t do prior art searching for all of our applications; it’s too expensive,” and the other 
wisely stated that all patents remain vulnerable, especially university patents due to their early 
stage:  
 
Inherent in how early you have to file, and how early the technology is, and how 
often people disclose before they file, university patents are vulnerable. . . . We want to 
file the best patent, but we can’t always. You can’t control patent quality like you can 
in corporations.  
  
Another TTO concerned about IPRs specifically consults with its licensees whenever it is 
considering enforcement, and specifically counsels them to guard against IPRs by running an 
extensive prior art search on the patent before taking any steps toward enforcement. They 
explain that this extra step is designed to find any art that was not discovered before and allow 
 
 
both the licensee and the TTO to more accurately assess the risk of losing an IPR attack on the 
patent.  
However, these TTOs are in the minority. For the vast majority of TTOs, the risk of IPR 
is not at all an important factor as to whether they enforce their patent. The reasons are 
economic, cultural, and logistical.38 Simply put, for most TTOs, there are so many other 
competing and more important considerations that go into the analysis about whether to enforce 
a patent such that the threat of IPR does not significantly affect the ultimate decision.  
First, TTOs execute a complicated economic analysis to decide whether it makes sense to 
enforce a patent against an infringer. IPRs are only a small part of that analysis, both because 
usually a licensee is footing the bill, and also because even if the university is paying, the IPR is 
only a small percentage of the whole. TTOs cited the relatively low cost of an IPR as compared 
to the total litigation expense. As one TTO stated, remembering the analysis it went through 
before enforcing a patent: “Given the costs of cases, the cost of IPR would still be relatively 
inconsequential . . . We were well aware that IPRs were possible when we filed,” and another 
TTO: “Is it a pebble on the scale? I suppose, but it is a pebble.” For these TTOs, other concerns 
other than IPRs weighed much more heavily in the economic analysis. For starters, as one TTO 
reported, it must consider the unique challenges facing a university enforcement that make 
enforcement more difficult: since universities do not make and sell a product, an injunction is not 
a sufficient remedy for a university, and further, because the patents are so early stage and may 
be one of several patents being used in the infringing product, it is a riskier and more expensive 
proposition for a university plaintiff to prove infringement, let alone damages. TTOs attempt to 
consider all aspects of the case that may weigh into the overall chance of success, and the IPR 
may have only a small role to play:  
 
Litigations are always a time and money sink. We have to evaluate whether [the whole 
case] is worth it on the merits, how long it will last, who the adversary would be, and 
whether we can come to a settlement agreement first. [We] always have had to do this—
IPRs are just part of the analysis now.  
 
The analysis of whether to enforce a patent is at least as much if not more about whether 
the patent is strong, valuable and infringed, and even the kind of technology the patent is over, 
than about the risk of IPR, even if losing the IPR means losing the asset altogether. The 
economic analysis is multifaceted and complex.  
Beyond economic reasons, TTOs also must address cultural influences that prevent them 
from pursuing patent enforcement. Many TTOs claim that they face philosophical hurdles to 
trying to enforce their patents that take precedent over any risk of IPR as a deciding factor. TTOs 
confess a common institutional reluctance to enforce patents at all because of a real or perceived 
conflict with the TTO mission to simply protect and license (but not enforce against infringement 
of) inventions. For example, one TTO explained: “Every patent owner knows if you do not 
enforce sometimes, you have no credibility . . . [but] our mission is tech transfer. The only time 
we would enforce a patent is when the technology is significant and widely practiced, and 
licensing overtures have gone ignored.” Another TTO questioned whether enforcement is ever 
 
38 For an excellent discussion of the complex set of considerations behind a TTO’s decision to enforce its patents, 
see Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University Patent Enforcement, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 169 (2013). 
 
 
appropriate for a TTO, but also acknowledged that a culture of nonenforcement creates a tension 
that makes serving different constituencies difficult:  
 
We have one case where we are exploring enforcement. There are bad faith facts, the 
inventors are worked up, so we have some buy-in to at least investigate. But that’s not 
what we articulate as our mission. We are supposed to be about getting the technology 
out into the world. If someone is already using [the technology], is that mission 
accomplished? But our client is also a series of inventors—they want attribution, and the 
money means something to them; it is hard to tell them ‘don’t worry about it.’  
 
Relatedly, TTOs also want to ensure that their actions uphold the good reputation of both 
the university and its inventions. Depending on the philosophy of the TTO, this can either mean 
no enforcement (if enforcement is seen to be counter to the university’s mission) or stronger 
enforcement (so as to reinforce the integrity of their licensing and to show that the patents have 
value). The first approach is illustrated by this quote from an institution that does not often 
enforce its patents:  
 
The issue is that [university name] doesn’t want to go off and sue people. We often get 
requests to sue from our PIs [principal investigators]. We go through the motions, but we 
are just not going to send the mean letter. We at most are going to send the “Gosh, are 
you aware of this patent?” letter.  
 
But another TTO has the exact opposite approach since they believe in stronger 
enforcement:  
 
We are one of the highest [patent] filers in the nation. We have valuable IP assets with 
economic impact and a mission of developing IP. It is important we are seen to be 
protecting our IP. We don’t want to be frivolous, and we don’t pursue everything, but we 
need to maintain our reputation. IPRs are one of several factors we consider [when we 
enforce]; we want our patents to stay valid.  
 
A final TTO summarized the tensions well:  
 
[It’s a] fine line that you walk—people have to know you would enforce, but you cannot 
go after everyone. We try to be fair; reputationally it’s both about the strength of 
our patents and also about our conduct as partners and in the industry. And it’s about our 
goals. We are not revenue driven, like a company. We are part of the university. 
 
Finally, TTOs may not be considering IPRs heavily in their enforcement analysis because 
they are overwhelmed by administrative hurdles. The TTOs are only one part of the university. 
One TTO lamented that even when the case for enforcement was clear, the enforcement calculus 
was still complicated because it depended on the players involved: “the politics are hell; we 
might find ourselves suing a company that has a founder that will fund a [university] building.” 
Another TTO discussed the many ways that the university was connected to the community and 
the inherent conflicts of interest that created:  
 
 
 
The TTO represents one aspect of the university, but not all of [university name]. You 
don’t make friends this way [by enforcing patents]. There are donors, partners, etc. . . . 
And overall, it’s not like our office brings in more than the development office, 
so we have to listen to them. . . . If [an infringer] wants to give money to research or hire 
our students, we’re just not going to do it [enforce a patent] . . . Relationships are now far 
more complicated because students are going to work at [companies that are infringing 
our patents], they are starting their own companies, professors and alumni are on boards, 
it’s a very complicated mine field you have to navigate. We have to be pretty 
positive about the validity and the strength of the patent and that someone’s 
product infringes before we would consider it. . . . It is so much more complicated when 
you are a university rather than a corporation.  
  
Before getting approval to file a patent lawsuit, TTOs often face layers of bureaucracy, 
such as getting sign-off from the highest levels of the university, or even of the state attorney 
general’s office in the case of a public university (when a state university enforces a patent, 
technically it is the state that is the plaintiff and the case is funded by taxpayer dollars). As one 
TTO explained the process at her university:  
 
You have to get it approved by the Office of General Counsel, you then go to a 
subcommittee of Regents who have to decide if it’s a gamble worth taking, and litigation 
counsel might have to convince them; then you have to structure a fee schedule, possibly 
look at patent strength scores, evaluate who the defendant is. . . . In sum, it’s a last resort.  
 
The analysis becomes even more complicated when the university is part of a larger 
system, where the possibility of a conflict multiplies across the many related schools. As a result, 
enforcement of a university patent is exceedingly rare and does not depend heavily on the 
possibility of IPR. Many of the TTOs interviewed did not think that their office had ever 
enforced a patent, and not one of the TTOs currently has more than four active litigations. 
In sum, there are many conditions that go into whether a TTO enforces a patent. The 
possibility of IPR is one consideration that TTOs might keep in mind, but it is not near the top of 
the list.  
 
4. “Have IPRs caused changes to your budgeting?” 
 
Because increased risk often equals increased cost, the new IPR proceedings might be 
forcing TTOs to allocate money differently to ready themselves for any eventual IPR challenge. I 
asked the TTOs to consider whether they had changed their budgeting both to support new filing 
techniques designed to strengthen the quality of their patents, as well as to set aside money to 
address IPR defense, either within or apart from enforcement litigation.  
Those who have implemented slightly modified filing policies to improve their patent 
quality at least in part because of IPRs, have modified their budgets accordingly. One TTO is 
paying for more continuation practice to keep claims alive should the need come to hedge bets 
on a patent under attack through IPR. Although continuations are not terribly expensive, this 
TTO has had to increase the budget for its patent filing. Similarly, another TTO is taking steps to 
improve the quality of its patents in the face of potential IPRs by sending its provisionals out to 
 
 
be drafted by outside attorneys, instead of handling all its provisional application filing in house. 
That university is filing fewer patents now, but also was able to reallocate the filing budget to 
accommodate the change in policy.  
However, as to budgeting specifically for IPR defense, although some TTOs seemed to 
have some misgivings about it, not one TTO reported changing its budget to accommodate any 
additional risk presented by IPRs. Some specifically mentioned that they had not experienced 
enough IPRs to worry about allocating funds:  
 
No—when we set our budget, we go through various questions about what costs may 
come up this year. . . . An individual issue may cause us to adjust our overall budget for 
the year, but IPRs are not a separate line item. We don’t anticipate them and don’t 
budget for them because we haven’t had many.  
 
The consensus across the TTOs is that budgeting specifically for IPR defense is 
unnecessary given that the risk of exposure was so low. They cite that a rare set of circumstances 
would have to occur for an IPR to be filed. TTOs also complain that they barely have enough 
money to cover the cost of the necessary patent filings they hope to do within the office. 
Although they might like to have some money put aside for IPR emergency or for any sort of 
enforcement, they are already barely meeting their current costs:  
 
I’ve been thinking about a buffer—do we need one? If a patent is valuable, should we 
have a war chest—to enable us to go after a third party if needed? For example, if a 
licensee says we don’t owe you a royalty, because we are not using the patent any more, 
we have no budget to make this inquiry. We don’t have money set aside to do this. We 
haven’t even progressed to asking where [that money] would come from! I’ve been with 
the office for 13 years, and our budget has been essentially the same. We pay all costs for 
licensed and non-licensed patents. To think about a reserve is hard when we don’t even 
have enough [money] to patent.  
 
Besides the low risk of occurrence, TTOs also explain that they have decided not to 
budget for IPRs because in most cases the university would not be responsible for funding the 
defense. Since most IPRs occur against licensed patents, TTOs assume that in most cases the 
licensee—not the university—will have to pay for the defense. And even in the smaller set of 
situations where the university would be responsible for paying, such as when the IPR challenges 
an unlicensed patent, a patent is nonexclusively licensed to several parties (such that any one 
licensee is not responsible for paying), or when the licensee cannot afford to defend the patent, 
the TTOs can rely on traditional as well as possibly some new options to finance the defense. 
One TTO described her relationship with a law firm on a fee arrangement that has helped with 
—and even encouraged—enforcement over the past ten years: 
 
Occasionally the firm has done some evaluation of some patents, has come to us 
proposing enforcement. That’s how these last two cases came about. We convinced the 
licensee to go ahead with enforcement. We may decide to do a few others. . . . As a 
whole, the university is risk averse in terms of IP; they try to have relationships with 
companies, try not to sue those we have relationships with. . . . But coming from industry, 
 
 
I feel you should enforce. It is a way to get value out of your patents if you can’t license. 
Frankly we have a lot of patents on the books just sitting there.  
 
And other TTOs explain a new model for financing enforcement and IPR defense that 
involves a separate litigation financier providing the money for the proceedings: 
 
The universities generally don’t fund the litigation themselves; they look for a law firm 
on contingency, or they engage with a litigation financier. There is more of that 
happening in the industry. It is expensive, but these are investment firms investing in IP 
through financing the litigation. It is basically debt financing; they advance the money for 
the litigation. If it is successful, they recover a multiple of what they fronted (through 
damages after the university pays back expenses) and then a percentage of a share of 
royalties going forward.  
 
Several TTOs mention the litigation financier option as possibly increasing TTO 
willingness to enforce patents (and defend against IPRs) because it erases the stigma of working 
with a contingency law firm and “feeling like a troll.”39 Because under the financier scenario the 
TTO can choose to work with its preferred law firm and control the litigation, it may allow TTOs 
to enforce their patents in a way that feels more within the mission of the university. In fact, 
these firms seem to be specifically targeting universities as a viable option:  
 
What’s my budget for enforcement? Zero. None. But we almost don’t need it; litigation 
funders are a pretty big part of the litigation scene now. They are like VC [venture 
capital] firms sitting on funds and [they] will buy a piece of litigation. You hire the firm, 
they will pay the fees, in exchange for 40% of revenue. This is available to 
universities. A lot of these firms were at AUTM [annual conference of the Association of 
University Technology Managers] to pitch their services.  
 
Should working with a law firm or a litigation financier not be possible, the TTOs explain 
that they would have to take those situations as they come. Each describes a process whereby 
they would analyze whether it was worth defending the challenged patent, and if so, where they 
would go to request funding. One TTO surmised the extra funding would come from litigation 
funding the TTO always receives from the home school of the affected patent; another TTO said 
it would seek funding thorough the general counsel’s office that would be allocated by a 
committee, and several said that they would have to find the money elsewhere in the TTO budget 
or from a different university department:  
 
I do think about it—what would we do if and when IPR were to happen? We would look 
at the status of the case—how much is it worth it to us to fight. For each case we analyze 
risk—we consider whether we file overseas, divide the patent, etc. There is always a cost 
benefit analysis. So we would look at all facts—how old is the patent, what is its track 
 
39 See Rooksby, supra note 38, at 187-191 (discussing how hiring contingency law firms—as opposed to litigation 
financiers—feels more “like a troll” to certain TTOs); see also Jacob H. Rooksby, University Involvement in Patent 
Infringement Litigation, 47 LES NOUVELLES 8, 17 (2012) (“However, some technology transfer professionals who 
indicate their university has engaged law firms on a contingency fee basis in the past have stated they view these 
risk-sharing arrangements as perilous or even inappropriate for universities to accept.”). 
 
 
record of licensing, is it a slow market that will be important even if not yet important. . . 
. I have a hunch that if they are filing an IPR [especially if outside a litigation], it is 
probably an important patent. If it is that important, we probably would find money to 
manage the cost. We would reach out to the university to support the effort, 
or reallocate some costs.  
 
Regardless of the ultimate decision, TTOs—at least at this stage—are content to maintain 
current budget policy and wait to deal with an IPR defense only when and if the problem should 
arise.  
 
IV. What does the future hold for TTOs contemplating IPRs?  
 
Even though it has been more seven years since the IPR procedure was implemented, the 
effects of IPRs have not been what might have been expected. Whether by virtue of the early-
stage technology that TTOs patent, their philosophy of limited enforcement, or use of a structure 
whereby patents that are commercialized are usually licensed, TTOs have not yet had to 
systemically change their filing, enforcement, licensing, or budgeting policies to accommodate 
IPRs.  
But the TTOs I interviewed were withholding judgment about what the next five years 
would bring. Looking forward, there may be changes in case law that would encourage TTOs to 
react. Although IPR proceedings do not yet drive TTO decision making, case decisions could 
still settle uncertainty and give TTOs finality on how to proceed.  
For example, even as sovereign immunity is not providing much of a licensing advantage 
to public universities yet, it would still be efficient to resolve the uncertainty around its 
applicability. Knowing at what point the state university patent owner waives the sovereign 
immunity defense because of involvement in a litigation proceeding will definitely help plan 
litigation strategy for even the few numbers of enforcement proceedings going forward. 
Similarly, it is hard to use sovereign immunity as a bargaining chip in a licensing negotiation if it 
is not clear if the defense can shield the patent licensee. TTOs should continue to monitor IPR 
cases until that question regarding licensees is resolved. It will be interesting to see if the 
CAFC’s decision on tribal immunity will have implications for state sovereign immunity cases.40 
And finally, there are still questions left open by Oil States about the constitutionality of IPRs 
under the Due Process and Takings clauses, and whether IPR should be able to apply to patents 
that issued before the AIA. It is not inconceivable that the CAFC or even the United States 
Supreme Court might have to consider those questions in the terms ahead. Even though IPRs 
have not affected TTO policy significantly, it would still be a relief if IPR proceedings were 
completely shut down on constitutional grounds.  
TTOs must also keep informed on executive branch and legislative activity related to 
IPRs. The PTAB is now grappling with how to retroactively apply the results of SAS Institute to 
IPRs that were incorrectly decided. This holds huge implications for the few IPRs to which 
TTOs are party, as to whether the PTAB needs to consider the additional claims, and what the 
estoppel effect of these IPR decisions will be on any infringement lawsuits. In addition, USPTO 
Director Iancu has been outspoken about the IPR process, and he acknowledges that industry 
blamed IPRs and associated uncertainty about patent value as contributing to the US falling from 
 
40 Or if in fact the case may be overturned. As of this writing, the case is on petition for certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court.  
 
 
first place to twelfth on the United States Chamber of Commerce annual Global IP Index patent 
list from 2017-2018.41 Following Director Iancu’s announcements that he would like his office 
to focus on “increasing the reliability of the patent grant,” specifically addressing IPR 
proceedings, hoping to “balance rights-holder’s and rights challenger’s interests,”42 which led to 
the USPTO rulemaking that harmonized standards of review between the PTAB and district 
courts, in 2019 the US returned to a second place ranking.43 
IPRs have also caught the attention of Congress. Legislation introduced in 2018 in the 
House, with a parallel bill reintroduced in the Senate was designed to address some of patent 
owners’ most salient criticisms of IPR proceedings. Its sponsors are hoping to reintroduce the 
bill in the 2019 Congress. Entitled the Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth 
and Economic Resilience (“STRONGER”) Patents Act of 2018,44 the bill, among other things 
sought to: align the PTAB and district court claim construction and burden of proof standards; 
impose a standing requirement to bring an IPR; give deference to prior court adjudications of 
validity and limit the number of challenges that can be brought against the same patents and 
claims; allow a patent owner to more easily amend claims during an IPR; and create separate 
panels of judges to decide on instituting an IPR and ruling on the merits. The bill also addressed 
a few issues to make infringement lawsuits easier to file and win, namely revising the standard 
for inducing infringement, making it possible to infringe even if manufacturing of infringing 
product occurs overseas, reinstating the presumption that an injunction is appropriate if a patent 
is found valid and infringed, and giving the Federal Trade Commission the authority to file suit 
against parties that send demand letters issued in bad faith for purposes of extortion. Some form 
of this bill has been introduced for several sessions. Congress is responding not only to the 
numbers of invalidations, but also to some egregious misuse of the IPR system, as with hedge 
fund managers like Kyle Bass shorting stocks of biopharmaceutical companies and then 
launching IPRs to drive stock prices down.45 If IPRs continue invalidating patents at the current 
pace, and the numbers of IPR proceedings stay high, and stories like what is happening with 
Kyle Bass continue to pique the interest of Congress and the public, the legislation may gain 
traction.46  
 
41 U.S. Chamber International IP Index, GLOBAL INNOVATION POLICY CENTER (6th ed., Feb. 2018), at 35 
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf.  
42 Andrei Iancu, Director, at U.S. Chamber of Commerce Patent Policy Conference (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-andrei-iancu-us-chamber-commerce-patent-policy-
conference. 
43 U.S. Chamber International IP Index, GLOBAL INNOVATION POLICY CENTER (7th ed., Feb. 2019) 
https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/023593_GIPC_IP_Index_2019_4Pager.pdf.   
44 H.R. 5340, 115th Cong., https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr5340 (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). Analysis 
of its salient points is at Steve Brachman, STRONGER Patents Act Introduced in House, Seeks to Strengthen 
Crippled Patent System, IP WATCHDOG, Mar. 28, 2018, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/26/stronger-patents-
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45 See Gene Quinn, Post Grant Patent Challenges Concern Universities, Pharma, IP WATCHDOG, Apr. 1, 2015, 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/01/post-grant-patent-challenges-concern-universities-pharma/id=56351/. 
46 Many of the ideas set forth in the STRONGER Patent Act have been suggested separately by commentators as 
being good for patent owners and specifically small businesses. See Melissa Cerro, Navigating a Post America 
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Rights and Respect for the Presumption of Validity, IP WATCHDOG, Aug. 10, 2017, 
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validity/id=86680/. 
 
 
IPRs have transformed the patent litigation landscape. They will conceivably continue to 
play an important role for years to come. Although survey answers confirm that IPRs have not 
yet affected technology transfer to the point where TTOs must make significant policy changes, 
IPRs are an important consideration as TTOs make decisions about how best to fulfill their 
missions. TTOs should continue to follow the latest court decisions and executive and legislative 
proposals on IPRs. At some point IPRs may become a more significant part of the TTO 
landscape, particularly if shifting ideas about patent value, licensees with different licensing 
needs and philosophies, and new limits on patentable subject matter force TTOs to grapple with 
broader visions of mission that encompass increasingly more patent enforcement. 
 
